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1 
 
“Why did this happen to us?”  “Why would anyone want to ‘bomb’ 
the U.S.?”  These questions reverberated in conversations with 
students in our classrooms, family members, people in the grocery 
store, and children within popular television programs in the 
immediate aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001.  This 
bewilderment and shock is contingent on a national sense of self as 
innocent and just, rendered possible through an erasure of the 
historical and geo-political role of the U.S. in global domination.  
Discourses of victimization of power-holding groups – of the U.S. 
nation and its citizens (i.e., anti-immigration discourse), of white 
men (i.e., anti-affirmative action discourse), and of heterosexuals 
(i.e., anti-gay-rights discourse) – enables this national identity to 
emerge.  Such discourses advance the agenda of the New Right by 
appropriating the moral authority associated with systemic 
marginalization put forth by liberal and leftist groups in their 
struggles for social justice ( Kennedy 1996; Berlant 1997). 
 
 
2 
 
Popular representations in the wake of 9/11 provide the national 
narrative of victimization with a new sense of legitimacy and 
centrality.  The nation imagines itself within these representations 
by suturing a host of seemingly oppositional discourses together:  
“feminism” ushers in militarism; militarism provides a space for 
multicultural inclusion within the realm of the national imaginary; 
the U.S. drops bombs and food on Afghanistan.  The articulation of 
such divergent ideological formations positions a conservative and 
militaristic agenda to occupy the complete political spectrum in 
unprecedented ways.  This chameleon-like conservatism draws 
upon liberal discourses – such as feminism, multiculturalism, 
“democracy,” and inclusion – in the cultural production of the U.S. 
nation in the wake of 9/11 to articulate U.S. military aggression as 
a liberal democratic form.  Thus people make sense of the events of 
September 11 through narratives of victimization available in the 
popular culture of the United States.  These secure their meaning 
through liberal-democratic discursive formations (i.e., feminism, 
tolerance, multiculturalism) in order to achieve two neo-
conservative functions:  to mainstream militarization as a daily 
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practice and to contain dissent arising in the face of U.S. 
militarism. 
 
3 
 
This kind of conservatism may be traced in most recent history to 
the rise of the “new right” under the global leadership of Reagan 
and Thatcher (Bello 1994).  Of the post-9/11 moment, Mab Segrest 
writes: 
 
 
4 
 
Our leaders can now make tragically oversimplified arguments (so 
clearly belied by our own foreign policy) because of thirty years of 
careful propaganda and political work by the Right that has 
constantly rerouted conversations about class and power, race and 
power, gender and power, sexuality and power, into different 
narratives of “reverse discrimination” or “special rights” or “right 
to life.”  It is as if causes and effects have been so scrambled and 
distorted, the radar over our causal fields so jammed, that events 
come to us, quite literally this time, out of the blue and crashing 
into national consciousness (2003, p. xvii). 
 
 
5 
 
Our work here is to untangle some of the specific cultural moments 
when this kind of hegemony becomes visible.  By “hegemony,” we 
mean a “dominant cultural order which is consistently preferred, 
despite its articulation with structures of domination and 
oppression” (Grossberg 1996, p. 161).  While any particular 
hegemony relies upon the “political work” that precedes it (Segrest 
2003), hegemony is “never permanent” because it is an unstable 
cultural form which shifts over time (Hall 1997).  We call the 
particular, post-9/11 form of hegemony we analyze “chameleon 
conservatism” to signal the specificity of its form in this historical 
moment.  It draws upon previous rhetorics of “reverse 
discrimination,” yet it is not the same because the cultural and 
historical terrain has shifted.  Rhetorics from government and 
popular culture reinforce one another “intertextually” to produce 
chameleon conservatism.  Hence this hegemony appears in 
popular and government outlets, which prefer similar narratives 
and interpretations. 
 
 
6 
 
In order to explore the cultural production through which the 
conservative agenda has achieved its hegemony, we draw from an 
array of popular and government texts.  Many of these texts are 
ones we enjoy:  favorite television shows or magazines we like to 
read.  The selections are not systematic, let alone comprehensive, 
but they suffice to reveal patterns of chameleon conservatism in 
popular texts from everyday life.  Because hegemony is 
intertextual, it appears in diverse texts, and what matters is how 
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we read them.  We might not choose your favorite show or other 
example of chameleon conservatism, but we would expect it to be 
susceptible to such a reading.  Here we offer a critical reading 
practice that may be applied to any number of texts rather than a 
critique of a particular set of texts.  Of course, texts are polysemic, 
admitting many readings.  Yet hegemony often blinds people to 
multiple perspectives, curtailing polysemy and even appropriating 
alternative views.  In the face of such hegemony, cultural studies 
provides a mode of criticism “to enable people to understand what 
[is] going on, and especially to provide ways of thinking, strategies 
for survival, and resources for resistance” (Hall 1992, p. 2). 
 
7 
 
We begin by examining the ways in which feminist and pluralistic 
discourses have been mobilized to frame U.S. military aggression 
as an inevitable outcome “in response to the evil attack.”  Then we 
look at the infiltration of a new multicultural face of militaristic 
imagery into the realm of the popular.  Finally we explore the way 
the cooptation of liberal discourses circumvents critique and 
pathologizes individualized voices of dissent. 
 
 
 
 Popular Appropriations  
 
8 
 
If the history begins at the ground zero of 9/11, the question arises, 
“Why would they do this to us?”  The absence of historical 
knowledge or discussion of U.S. global hegemony made a narrative 
of innocence and victimization possible.  This section examines the 
conditions of possibility for the seeming inevitability of U.S. 
military intervention and the containment of dissent. 
 
 
9 
 
In calling attention to regressive uses of victimization in response 
to 9/11, however, we are not arguing that the attacks on the U.S. 
were justified or inevitable.  Rosalind P. Petchesky describes the 
reductionism we seek to avoid as “two opposed but mirror-image 
versions:  the narrative, advanced not only by the terrorists and 
their sympathizers but also by many on the left in the U.S. and 
around the globe, that blames U.S. cultural imperialism and 
economic hegemony for the ‘chickens coming home to roost’ 
versus the patriotic, right-wing version that casts U.S. democracy 
and freedom as the innocent targets of Islamist madness” (2003, 
p. 16).  We argue that the cultural production of U.S. innocence 
serves a current hegemony, but we do not say that the U.S. “got 
what it deserved.”  Through critical interrogations of explanations 
for 9/11, we seek rather to examine how the trope of innocence 
promotes U.S. militarism and contains dissent. 
 
Aimee Carrillo Rowe and Sheena Malhotra 59 Poroi, 2, 1, August, 2003 
 
10 
 
In the wake of  September 11, there was a proliferation of popular 
images that attempted to make sense of the day’s events.  Although 
television specials produced in the week following 9/11 tried to 
provide a historical context for U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, 
the longest surviving and most popular narratives have been the 
ones that sutured the events of this day to the narrative of 
victimization.  “Isaac and Ishmael,” the episode of The West Wing 
written by Aaron Sorkin specifically to address 9/11, presents the 
U.S. as being attacked for its pluralism and for being an open 
society.  It resolves the anxiety surrounding this construction by 
arguing that the most heroic or patriotic act is to protect and fight 
for this particular way of life and these “freedoms.”  One storyline 
in the episode involves a group of high school students who are 
visiting the White House when there is an imminent threat of 
terrorism against the U.S.  They are held for their own safety, 
becoming the embodiment of what Lauren Berlant (1997) has 
called the “infantile citizen” as The West Wing staff educates them 
about reasons for the attacks.  They learn that elements of 
American society ranging from Judeo-Christian teachings and 
women’s empowerment in the West to the principle of an open 
society are unpalatable to fundamentalist terrorists.  One staff 
member, Josh, articulates the notions of liberalism to project an 
enemy that is narrow-minded, irrational, and ultimately evil.  “So 
what bothers them about us?  Well, the variety of cheers alone 
coming from the cheap seats in Giant stadium when they’re 
playing the Cowboys is enough to start a jihad.   To say nothing of 
street corners lined with church next to synagogue next to 
mosque.  Newspapers, they can print anything they want.  And 
women who can do anything they want.  Including taking a rocket 
ship to outer space, vote, and play soccer.  This is a plural society.  
That means we accept more than one idea.  It offends them.” 
 
 
11 
 
The enemy constructed by this popular television series is one who 
is willing to attack a society that is good, free, and innocent, in 
order to impose his restrictive and fundamentalist views on them.  
This story frames the U.S. as an innocent player on the world 
stage, wherein “we” were merely going about our business and 
“they” invaded us without particular provocation.  The implication 
is that we are being invaded “just for being who we are.”  This 
representation justifies a military response because it erases 
histories of U.S. dominance, locating the attack as an unprovoked 
and therefore incomprehensible act of evil.  The narrative relies on 
a progressive “American way of life” that may be defended by 
merely ignoring the political events and continuing with business 
as usual.  Josh’s parting words to the students tell them what they 
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– and by extension, the audience – should do to defend “our” way 
of life in these troubled times:  “Worry about school; go out and 
meet guys, or girls.  Be good to each other; go the movies, parties. 
Remember pluralism.  Do you wanna get these people?  If you 
really want to reach in and kill them where they live?  Keep 
accepting more than one idea.  Makes them absolutely crazy!” 
 
12 
 
Therefore one of the solutions provided by this special The West 
Wing episode is to defend against a terrorism aimed at the heart of 
the U.S. – the American way of life – by defiantly continuing to live 
and celebrate “American” freedoms.  This seemingly liberal 
response appears all the more shocking and admirable when it is 
set against a reading of the terrorist action as evil and unprovoked. 
The Bush administration’s response to 9/11 effectively used the 
construction of a free and plural society under attack.  It was 
organized precisely according to these same two principles.  The 
first response from the administration was to justify military 
action.  It constructed the conflict in binary terms of good vs. evil.  
It elevated the actions of a few men, not formally associated with 
any government, to an “act of war” – as opposed to calling it a 
“criminal act.”  This classification set the stage for the military 
action that members of the administration wanted to pursue, and 
the mainstream media did not question it in any meaningful 
manner. 
 
 
13 
 
The second response by Bush was a call to thwart the terrorist 
intent of attacking American freedoms by having Americans go 
about their lives “as usual” (September 20, 2001).  “Freedoms” 
were often equated with consumerism to keep American 
businesses solvent and with returning to work as our patriotic 
duty.  A wide range of media outlets, including National Public 
Radio, echoed Bush’s call to reinvest in an unreflexive and 
capitalistic way of life. Thus U.S. popular-cultural narratives of 
victimization that secure their meaning through liberal-democratic 
discursive formations served the priority of the Bush 
administration to support big corporations (instead of laid-off 
workers).  Big business lobbied for corporate aid in the form of 
special tax breaks and bailouts (Morgenson 2001), and the 
government awarded billions of dollars in such aid under the guise 
of protecting the “American way of life.”  Rescinding civil rights for 
average Americans, on the other hand, was classified as part of the 
strategy of military action. 
 
 
14 
 
Both responses were predicated on the construction of a nation 
that is good, innocent, and under attack by evil forces.  Indeed  
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Bush’s s next Thanksgiving speech (November 20, 2001) 
characterized the nation as a “free, faithful and fair-minded land.”  
Such a construction relies upon a narrative of victimization in 
order cast the attacks as unprovoked and illogical.  The call for a 
united “America” within a binary construction of “us vs. them” 
precluded effective critique of the U.S. government at this time.  
We were expected to go about our lives in an oblivious fashion to 
show “the terrorists” that they cannot “get the best of us.”  Binary 
constructions of us vs. them, good vs. evil, civilized vs. uncivilized, 
light vs. dark, civilized vs. barbaric were all evoked by national 
leaders in the West within the first few hours of the September 11 
events.   Bush took this discourse to its logical explicit extreme 
when he stated, “You are either with us, or with the terrorists” 
(September 20, 2001).  Media coverage, instead of questioning 
such rhetoric, bought into it and built on it. 
 
15 
 
The use of the binary in this case was problematic, reducing 
complicated histories to a simplistic narrative that erases the 
impact of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.  It also allowed 
the U.S. to define the terms of inclusion.  Therefore all the nations 
of the world were placed in the position of proving their loyalty to 
the U.S. by providing support that went beyond early words.  This 
construction allowed the U.S. to define its problems as the world’s 
problem, centering globe around itself.  That equation seldom has 
worked in the other direction when there has been terrorism – 
sometimes as a direct impact of U.S. hegemony – in other parts of 
the world (such as Latin America, Russia, Kashmir, etc.).  These 
binaries linked to the theme of a nation victimized by evil 
terrorists; they cast the U.S. as the innocent underdog that all the 
nations of the world must gather to protect.  Therefore in a move 
of chameleon conservatism, the administration successfully 
appropriated the liberal discourse of pluralism to rally the world to 
its cause. 
 
 
16 
 
This trope of “us” and “them” also functioned paradoxically in 
terms of setting up the U.S. as savior of the world.  This is a 
representation born directly from the construction of the American 
nation as just and as the most powerful in the world.  Over the past 
decade, with the fall of the Soviet Union, this has fed a national 
investment in America as the “police” of the globe.  This 
articulation of national identity, alongside the evocation of the U.S. 
as innocent victim, worked to salvage American pride.  As used by 
neo-conservatives, it is contingent on a paradoxical victim-hero 
construction.  Victimization produces anxiety that becomes 
resolved through regressive or retaliatory measures that are cast as 
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heroic.  Other examples have been the attack on affirmative action, 
with Proposition 187 in California, the fortification of the U.S.-
Mexico border, and the Defense of Marriage Act. 
 
17 
 
Even when “America was under attack,” according to the Bush 
administration rhetoric, America chose to “strike back” with 
“restraint.”  Thus the U.S. took a few weeks to strategize before 
sending planes to bomb Afghanistan.  The military action was 
“thoughtful” and “just.”  It was retaliatory, but framed as a way to 
“save” the people of Afghanistan.  Therefore Bush appropriated 
liberal suggestions that the U.S. “drop food on Afghanistan instead 
of bombs” by doing both.  This co-opted liberal sentiments to paint 
his conservative, militaristic agenda as a compassionate one.  
Much the same can be said of the Bush appeal to each America’s 
child to do extra chores to make a dollar to send to the children of 
Afghanistan.  These rhetorical campaigns expressed the essential 
strategy of chameleon conservatism by blatantly hijacking liberal 
discourses in a move designed, not for “infinite” or even effective 
justice, but rather for selling the American people on war in 
Afghanistan as just and compassionate. 
 
 
18 
 
Perhaps the most effective and popular appropriation of liberal 
discourses to promote this militarism was the Bush use of feminist 
critiques of the Taliban regime to justify the Afghanistan war.  In 
tow, the media narrated U.S. military action as a campaign to 
“save” women in Afghanistan who had been forced to live under 
the repressive regime of the Taliban.  This was a blatant co-
optation of feminism to justify the use of force.  In particular, it 
tapped liberal feminism, which argues for the rights of women as 
human beings.  This neo-conservative discourse uses U.S. feminist 
advances and the status of U.S. (white) women (privileged by class, 
nationality, and color) as a measure by which to judge the lives of 
Afghani women. 
 
 
19 
 
After September 11, many networks had broadcast specials about 
Taliban restrictions on women in Afghanistan.  CNN presented 
Inside Afghanistan:  Behind the Veil (2001), and NBC aired The 
War on Women (2001).  Many of these reports were narrated by 
presumably “liberated” women residing in the West.  Once again, 
the binary construction of the “uncivilized East” vs. the “civilized 
West” provided the ground against which these narratives took 
shape and gathered emotional appeal.  On CBS, one special about 
the future of women in Afghanistan was promoted with the 
question, “Do they have one?”  These were popular appropriations 
of liberal discourses to reinforce the idea that the women in 
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Afghanistan would not have a future unless the forces of the good 
and civilized West defeated the forces of the evil, barbaric, male-
dominated East.  An implication of this rhetoric was that, when the 
U.S. dropped its bombs, it was doing so not only for citizens of the 
U.S. but for women in Afghanistan as well.  Feminist ideologies 
were mobilized and rewritten by an ever-changing, chameleon, 
conservative rhetoric to advance an ongoing militaristic agenda.  
The irony is that some of those bombs fell on the women the U.S. 
was supposedly saving, which was seldom acknowledged in the 
media coverage.  More typical was an issue of Time that shows 
unveiled Afghani woman with Anglo features on the cover and 
presents U.S. military action as based on feminist ideals (Lacayo 
2001). 
 
20 
 
Neither the U.S. government nor the U.S. media showed 
significant concern for Afghani women and their suffering under 
the Taliban.  Despite attempts by feminist groups and a few media 
personalities (e.g., Mavis Leno) to draw global attention to the 
plight of Afghani women, the U.S. response had been practically 
non-existent. The U.S.-based Feminist Majority Foundation had 
been working in collaboration with the Revolutionary Association 
of the Women of Afghanistan ( RAWA) for many years to raise 
awareness about women oppressed by the Taliban.  In May 2001, 
the Bush Administration had pledged  $43 million to Afghanistan 
as “emergency aid” for drought, but directed it toward farmers 
affected by the ban on poppy cultivation that the U.S. government 
was trying to encourage (Crossette 2001).  This ignored the call of 
feminist organizations to denounce the atrocities against women 
being committed by the Taliban, and it would have strengthened 
the hold of a regime that the U.S. did not even recognize officially. 
 
 
21 
 
Therefore it is not surprising that, although the U.S. government 
and the U.S. media co-opted feminist discourses post 9/11, only 
the aspects that serve U.S. interests got much attention.  For 
example, the U.S. media continued to ignore abuses committed by 
the Northern Alliance, abuses documented by feminist 
organizations such as RAWA.  The government and media 
construction of the Northern Alliance as outnumbered 
“revolutionaries” erased their abuses, allowing the U.S. 
government to align with them as “heroic fighters.”  Co-opting the 
feminist critique of the Taliban, previously neglected for five years, 
helped to construct the West as “civilized” and “heroic” in saving 
racialized women from the “barbaric” and “evil” Islam of “radical” 
and “dark” men in the “East.” 
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22 
 
Thus conservative rhetoric occupied a broader part of the political 
spectrum by co-opting and distorting liberal discourses.  The use 
of binary constructions enabled an “us” vs. “them” orientation able 
to sustain oxymoronic conduct such as showing compassion 
toward a nation and bombing it at the same time.  The 
appropriation of liberal discourses helped this conservative 
rhetoric combine a heroic sense of the American nation with 
compassion for Americans as underdogs and victims.  An America 
unfairly victimized by evil men would have to strike back to protect 
“our” way of life.  Likewise the distortion of liberal feminism let 
Americans believe that U.S. military action was meant to save 
Afghani women.  They became merely one more convenient 
pretext for U.S. military action. 
 
 
 
 
Reality TV and the 
Multicultural Face 
of U.S. Militarism 
 
 
23 
 
Self-conscious and increasingly popularized notions of U.S. 
militarism have been emerging in the wake of 9/11.  The Bush 
administration and the entertainment industry self-consciously 
joined forces in an effort to secure their mutual interests.  “Last 
month, a White House contingent (including President Bush’s 
political advisor Karl Rove) met with executives from AOL Time 
Warner, Universal Studios, the Recording Industry Association of 
America, Viacom . . . and other entertainment industry types, 
during which Washington and Hollywood threw around some 
ideas on how to boost interest in the War on Terrorism.”  These 
interests make the popular culture into an increasingly overt site of 
“government propaganda” for militarism (Chocano 2002, p. 2). 
 
 
24 
 
In the aftermath of the events of September 11, we saw more 
images of U.S. military action, and they tapped into a new 
conservative attention to pluralistic senses of multiculturalism.  
The formation of a new hero is emerging, a “common man” raised 
to the status of heroism, whose face is not necessarily white or 
even male.  Within a chameleon-conservative discursive 
formation, competing and contradictory discourses are fused in 
this face:  imperialistic and multicultural, militaristic and tolerant, 
individualistic and community-oriented, heartless and 
compassionate.  As Richard Smith, Newsweek Chair and Editor-in 
Chief, introduced the “Commemorative Issue” of the magazine, 
“On September 11, an act of hate changed all our lives, but amid 
the horror of those moments, and in the days and weeks since, 
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there have been thousands – millions – of individual acts of 
bravery and generosity, acts that testified to our profound sense of 
community.  Ordinary people made extraordinary contributions.  . 
. . A renewed sense of patriotism united the country, reaffirming 
our shared values of kindness, tolerance, diversity and liberty” 
(2001, p. 1).  This “renewed sense of patriotism” articulates a set of 
“shared values” that draw on liberal notions of “kindness, 
tolerance, diversity and liberty.”  Smith linked them to a newly 
“compassionate” face of military aggression.  A few pages into this 
text, an image of U.S. sailors benignly “waving farewell before 
shipping out” serves as the unnamed backdrop of “revenge” for a 
host of stories about “Americans back on our feet” (Auchincloss 
2001, pp. 15-16), revealing that these dovish values are contingent 
on a hawkish geo-political stance. 
 
25 
 
Certainly the images of U.S. aggression have proliferated since the 
unprecedented “attack on America.”  Films such as Black Hawk 
Down (2001) gave the nation’s obsession with violence and 
domination a new sense of righteousness.  Older military films are 
also being rerun, newly advertised and placed against other 
military programming.  In 2002, for instance, movies such as The 
Rock (1996) were programmed immediately after Combat 
Missions, one of a new spate of reality programs focused on 
themes of U.S. militarism.  Each commercial break within The 
Rock flashed to quick-cut shots from Combat Mission, collapsing 
images of the celebrity and the common man into heroic 
formations.  This programming merges the Hollywood 
glorification of U.S. militarism with the more mundane struggles 
of “average” citizens in “real” situations. 
 
 
26 
 
Fusing the commercial and the “real” in forming national military 
heroes becomes a cultural theme.  It travels seamlessly through 
film to reality TV then back on itself to influence the U.S. military 
and its recruitment practices.  This formation naturalizes 
militarism through tropes of pluralism.  It appropriates images of 
multiculturalism to form a new sense of patriotism that is “tolerant 
and diverse,” even as it is aggressively militaristic.  On one hand, 
reality TV and the Army recruitment propaganda that has emerged 
in its wake democratize because they include “average people” in 
their popular dramas.  On the other hand, they narrate U.S. 
military aggression.  What is “democratized” is an inclusive, 
multicultural space for the U.S. military, suturing militarism and 
multiculturalism.  Here the inclusive function of reality TV as a 
genre becomes a mechanism for popularizing militaristic themes.  
They grow in prominence after 9/11, and they blur contrasts 
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between “reality TV” and “military reality.”  In its recruiting, the 
U.S. military combines tropes and production techniques from this 
genre with its multiculturalism of stereotyped citizens in a national 
project of militarism. 
 
27 
 
The popularity of the reality genre stems in part from audience 
identification with the genre’s subjects:  ordinary citizens who gain 
instant celebrity.  Coauthoring a book on reality TV with 
Survivor’s first winner, Peter Lance explains that Americans have 
passed through a phase of fascination with celebrities into period 
when they can become celebrities.  “The whole reality TV thing was 
sparked by the desire of average people to become celebrities 
overnight” (Deggans 2002, p. 2).  The genre democratizes by 
blurring distinctions between “average  people” and elites.  It 
provides a popular context that foregrounds characteristics “we” 
all possess and can recognize in ourselves. 
 
 
28 
 
In the aftermath of 9/11, reality television has helped to normalize 
a militarized America.  Initially 9/11 threatened to discredit reality 
TV as not real enough.  “The reality format’s resilience was tested 
last fall when the September 11 attacks seemed to render contrived 
reality shows as either silly or offensive.  . . . Last year’s ratings 
sensations have cooled since September 11, and viewers and 
producers are more aware of the line between edgy and offensive.”  
Yet this “line” is being redrawn through military themes.  “As 
many as 10 new series expected to turn up on the air in the next 
several months,” each calling on qualities that would make 
contestants good soldiers, reveal the inner workings of military 
operations, or tap themes of American imperialism (Carter 2002, 
p. 1). 
 
 
29 
 
Thus ABC executives decided that 9/11 made it inappropriate to air 
The Runner, a reality show about an individual “hiding out while 
the whole country tracked him,” but the network chose to run The 
Chair, a reality show that monitors the vital signs of contestants 
and penalizes them for “losing their cool” (Carter 2002, p. 2).  Fox 
launched a similar series, The Chamber.  What makes The Runner 
“inappropriate” and The Chair or The Chamber appealing in this 
historical moment?  All three programs echoed the U.S. militarism 
in response to 9/11, but The Runner featured a figure 
interchangeable with Osama Bin Laden, a man hunted by “the 
whole country.”  Would it evoke too much sympathy for – or too 
much rage at – the hunted individual?  Either way, the program 
was liable to evoke responses unhelpful to American militarism.  It 
might portray everyday people less as military heroes than as 
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victims of militarized man-hunts.  The Chair and The Chamber, on 
the other hand, position average citizens in contexts that reward 
people who control bodily functions in the face of stress.  Hence 
they valorize qualities that can make good soldiers. 
 
30 
 
These programs turn the display of military qualities into 
spectacles.  Another set of reality shows make their militarism 
even more explicit.  CBS has plans to run a reality series about 
fighter-pilot training; while the USA Network has been airing 
Combat Missions, a show where teams of “non-active military 
and/or law enforcement guys try to complete their ‘missions’ 
before the others” (Deggans 2002, p. 1).  Producer Mark Burnett 
ties his USA show to the war in Afghanistan:  “This war is perfect 
timing for Combat Missions.  . . . This is the first exclusively special 
operations war.  Our show was only for special operations troops . . 
. (so) people have a chance to meet and get to know these people 
for real . . . see them do everything from taking down a drug lord to 
rescuing someone.  From the beginning, everyone understood, this 
was a really pro-military, patriotic show” (Deggans 2002, p. 1).  
With Combat Missions produced to be “pro-military” and 
“patriotic,” Burnett collapses the two.  This is a familiar move of 
chameleon conservatism, treating support for military action as a 
proof of patriotism. 
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The move to militarize reality television is one among many 
rhetorical devices to much the same effect in American culture 
since September 11.  In 2002, MTV aired a New Year’s Day 
celebration of the U.S. Armed Forces entitled For the Troops:  An 
MTV/USO Special.  It blends voices of celebrities and soldiers at 
the Ramstein Air Base in Germany.  Featured guests such as 
Jennifer Lopez, Kid Rock, Ja Rule, and Carson Daly share their 
“deep thoughts on the all-around awesomeness of the war in 
general and the U.S. armed forces in particular.”  Editing 
intersperses these words with outdoor footage of a concert for the 
soldiers and with “enthusiastic testimonials by young Air Force 
personnel, who never imagined that joining the Air Force could 
lead to a tête-à-tête with J. Lo herself” (Chocano 2002, p. 1). 
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Fans of Bob Hope know that the program was not unprecedented.  
What distinguishes it from the USO entertainments instigated by 
President Roosevelt in 1941 to boost troop morale in World War II 
is the way it celebritizes the ordinary soldiers and their 
equipment:  “This time, the Air Force is the star” (Chocano 2002, 
p. 1).   By melding the popular and the mundane, For the Troops 
normalizes participation in the U.S. Armed Forces even as it 
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inflates this into spectacle.  It configures Ramstein Air Base as a 
“regular club land” where military personnel “can party at a variety 
of hangouts, including a country bar and a hip-hop club” (Chocano 
2002, p. 1).  Yet it glamorizes military equipment as objects of 
fascination for the stars.  Lopez climbs onto an F-16 and compares 
it to the plane in Top Gun (1986), then she expresses a desire to 
shoot her next video on a large aircraft.  Kid Rock and Carson Daly 
playfully don gas masks, then Kid Rock thanks the U.S. military 
that he won’t ever have to wear the mask against his will.  The 
overall effect is to frame the work and living spaces of the troops as 
a music-video playground, hyping the daily objects and practices 
of military life into a fantasy of ennobling and enjoyable play. 
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Ongoing media spectacles occasioned by matters military project 
the U.S. Armed Forces sites of desire, belonging, and personal 
growth for average viewers.  They can identify with the military 
personnel, the “cool” qualities valorized, the military lifestyle 
glorified.  The U.S. Army has generated a host of recruitment 
rhetorics that feed and tap into these desires.  “Go Army” ads 
present young soldiers in hosts of war-game activities that excite 
by production techniques taken from MTV and reality TV.  Quick 
cuts, unsteady camera shots, and truncated conversations of 
soldiers are prominent.  Ads conclude with the announcement of 
an easy-to-remember website: “goarmy.com.”  The homepage 
resembles another reality program, Real World Chicago.  Both 
layouts picture a multicultural cast of characters in close-up face 
shots that capture a distinctive personality for each:   a young 
white woman smiling full-faced into the camera, a Latino with his 
head tilted back, a smiling black man.  Their first names are 
printed boldly beneath their photos. 
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Real World Chicagocelebrates the mundane struggles of young 
people living in close quarters.  “Go Army” projects such 
possibilities for a wide range of youths who seek places for growing 
and belonging.  The website foregrounds “recruit profiles.”  
Through quick-cut videos and brief blurbs from each “recruit,” it 
treats “Basic Training” as a site where “An Army of One” gets 
made.  “Follow the lives of six recruits,” it reads “as this real-life 
web series captures their nine-week journey from civilian to 
soldier.  Join them each week, via video and multimedia 
installments, as they overcome their fears, realize their strengths, 
and master the challenges of basic training.”  This user-friendly 
interface and the appropriation of postmodernist production 
techniques elevate the daily difficulties of individuals in basic 
training to the level of popular sagas where civilians become 
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soldiers and celebrities.  As the mother of recruit Michelle Boatner 
says in one video, “Everyone at work’s been watching her. . . .  They 
want to get her autograph.” 
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Click on each soldier’s name, and a “recruit profile” opens.  It 
offers a photograph in a setting that depicts the person’s interests, 
a brief inscription that summarizes a personal challenge to be 
overcome in basic training, and a short description of the 
individual’s “decision to enlist.”  A recruit profile also projects 
“Army Reserve and the future” and “basic training concerns.”  It 
gives a block inscription of the soldier’s age, height, weight, 
hometown, “MO’s,” and interests.  It even provides a series of 
photographs of the individual at critical points in basic training.  
Click on any photograph, and a video uses reality-TV style to 
portray racialized and gendered struggles that lead to a 
transformative moment for the individual.  For Michelle, a young 
white woman, these are Proving Yourself Wrong, Gas Mask, Basic 
Rifle Marksmanship, Final Fitness Test, and Final Thoughts.  
Michelle struggles within each video to overcome her fear of being 
away from her family.  “Proving something to herself” transforms 
her so that her “self-esteem is at an all-time high.”  The challenges 
for Ever, a first generation immigrant from Mexico, include A 
Journey for Independence, Pugil Bout, Defensive Live Fire, and A 
New Respect.  Ever grows closer to his mother, and Ever cries as 
he recounts his realization that “he deserves to be here.” 
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This multicultural military provides a site of national belonging for 
formerly excluded or stereotyped citizens such as blacks, Latinos, 
and women.  Luis Sanchez writes, “The Latino community has 
constantly been bombarded with the idea that they do not belong 
and are not American.  For this reason and a lack of economic 
opportunities, throughout history, many Latinos have joined the 
armed forces to prove their patriotism and support themselves.  
Since the 9/11 incident, Latinos have been forced once again to 
prove their patriotism” (Kim 2001, p. 4).  Ever’s personal 
transformation through experiences in basic training attest that he 
has become an “Army of One.”  He is a Mexican immigrant who 
has proven he belongs in the U.S. at a moment when his group has 
been under attack through such measures as California 
Proposition 187 and fortification of the U.S.-Mexico border as well 
as systematic abuses from the Border Patrol, INS, and employers. 
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These connections between reality TV, militarism, and 
multiculturalism provide a context for making sense of the 
popularity of U.S. military action in Afghanistan and Iraq.  They  
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help to popularize militarism as a site of identity formation by 
turning mundane practices and people of the American military 
into spectacles and celebrities.  They tap the rhetorical potential of 
reality television for democratic plots and multicultural images to 
present “average citizens” as stars in the U.S. Armed Forces.  Thus 
they support a chameleon conservatism slippery enough to occupy 
so many positions available in American politics that it undercuts 
and marginalizes critiques of U.S. military aggression. 
 
 
 Containment of Dissent  
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Another World is Possible:  Conversations in a Time of Terror 
(Kim 2001) attests to the need for alternative media to open up 
spaces for dialogue that dissents from the U.S. military response to 
the events of September 11.  As this collection suggests, any critics 
must envision “another world.”  In the forward, Kofi Taha (p. xx) 
writes that all who witnessed the violence in New York City and 
Washington D.C. on September 11 were “injured to their human 
core.”  Yet “not everyone believes that revenge will secure peace, 
that suspended civil liberties will secure safety, that getting back to 
business as usual is the best solution.  Not everyone believes the 
roots of terrorism simply rest in a fanatical and irrational hatred 
for freedom, democracy, or the United States.”  Therefore this 
collection “gives voice to the diverse perspectives that the 
American people did not have an opportunity to hear despite three 
days of commercial-free, 24 hour-a-day coverage on all major 
networks.” 
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In spite of such extensive coverage, the narration of nation in the 
current climate has been so truncated that alternative voices are 
heard with suspicion and hostility.  This holds for almost any form 
of dissent from the inevitability of U.S. military aggression, any 
departure from the popular depiction of the Taliban and Osama 
bin Laden as irrational and evil, any criticism of the desire to kill in 
response to being “attacked.”  Recently an email was circulated 
describing an incident at Princeton when Danny Glover talked 
against the death penalty.  In response to a hostile question about 
bin Laden deserving death, Glover stated that he is unequivocally 
against government killing.  He was booed off the stage, and many 
of his ensuing engagements were cancelled.  Glover was silenced to 
a noticeable extent for his refusal to stand behind the public hatred 
toward bin Laden.  In response to such situations, dissenters are 
left with fragmented tactics.  E-mail seems the main medium for 
such stories, producing a sense of isolation and hopelessness 
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among those who depart from the conventional wisdom.  
Introducing the Kim collection, Luis Sanchez writes that he was 
revitalized to hear Angela Davis speak passionately in a collective 
space.  It was not that he heard “anything new.”  Rather “I was in a 
room full of people I felt connected to, not sitting alone in front of 
my computer.  I was listening to someone speak passionately, not 
reading an email easier to delete than forward” (2001, p. 2). 
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The recent cultural production of “September 11” contains dissent 
by circumscribing the national narrative through several forms of 
erasure.  Conspicuously absent are criticism, images or words of 
protest, and modes of mobilization other than military.  Media 
coverage pathologizes people whose experiences, choices, or voices 
contest America’s liberal militarism.  This trend emerges in 
popular stories of individuals incongruent with the hegemonic 
narrative:  John Walker Lindh, April Ray, and Charles Bishop. 
 
 
41 
 
Each account draws upon tropes of the bizarre and inexplicable in 
an effort to explain the “un-Americanness” of a few “Americans.”  
This framing delegitimizes the critiques that these figures offer.  
Walker’s story is the widely published account of how a “bright, 
quiet kid from the heart of hot-tub country” becomes an 
“American Taliban” (Thomas 2001, p. 30).  Ray, the “American 
wife of a bin Laden operative,” is an “enigma” – a “devout Muslim” 
who defends her husband’s innocence in the face of evidence 
linking him to “a plot that killed 250 people and injured 5,000 
more” through an Embassy attack (Peraino 2001, p. 42).  Bishop’s 
“troubled past” shows how he was “inspired by the terrorist attacks 
on the World Trade Center” (Dahlburg 2002, p. A1) to crash a 
private plane into a Bank of America Plaza building and why he left 
a suicide note “declaring support for Osama bin Laden (Listan 
2002, p. 48). 
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The challenges to patriotism and the pathologies assigned to these 
people undermine the legitimacy of the counter-narratives that 
emerge within the stories of Walker, Ray, and Bishop.  The 
accounts are framed in psychological terms, focusing on family 
problems that span lines of race and religion, but emphasize 
religious experiments that stray from Christianity.  The tone 
alternates between pity and contempt as the lives of Walker, Ray, 
and Bishop are told in ways that render them powerless, pathetic, 
pathological.  Let us focus on John Walker, whose story is the most 
widely publicized of the three. 
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Media stories frame the Walker family as permissive:  liberal and 
tolerant in ways that gave him too little guidance, opening the way 
for his “extremist” turn.  To be “nonjudgmental, even supportive” 
of John’s “conversion,” his parents financed his endeavors abroad 
– although they “balked at calling him ‘Suleyman,’” his chosen 
Islamic name (Thomas 2001, p. 34).  John’s father, Frank Lindh is 
said to be “nonjudgmental” and “proud” of his son’s “alternative 
course.”  He remarked on the Early Morning Show, “I don’t think 
John was doing anything wrong.”  Then on Good Morning 
America, he said, “We want to give him a big hug and then a little 
kick in the butt for not telling us what he was up to” (Thomas 
2001, p. 36).  Yet such “gentle chiding” does not square with the 
hatred provoked for Walker’s “treason.”  Letters to Time reveal a 
sense of violent outrage.  As one writer put it, “I believe that if I 
had come upon him in Afghanistan, we wouldn’t have had to face 
the problem of what to do with him” (Houx 2002, p. 10).  George 
W. Bush’s earlier comments on an ABC interview legitimated the 
contempt:  “Make him leave his hair the way it is and his face as 
dirty as it is and let him go wandering around this country and see 
what kind of sympathy he would get” (Klaidman 2001, p. 21). 
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Walker’s family is not said to be unstable, but its liberal attitudes 
are condemned as too lenient, in contrast to the “tough liberalism” 
outlined in previous sections.  Their irresponsible liberalism put 
them “out of touch with reality.”  Walker came from the “most 
liberal, tolerant place in America, yet he was drawn to the most 
illiberal, intolerant sect in Islam, the Taliban” (Thomas 2001, p. 
32).  Such stories mark the limits of “liberalism” within broader 
discursive formations surrounding 9/11 as they pathologize the 
Walkers’ liberalism as “relativism.”  Walker’s home in Marin 
County is “mocked by the cartoon strip Doonesbury as the 
epicenter of the self-esteem movement, a land of hot tubs, Rolfing, 
and a bastion of moral relativism where divorces were for a time 
listed alongside marriages in the newspaper” (p. 33).  Marin 
County is “fringe country,” its values so different from those of 
“mainstream America.” The gap in “values” explains how Walker 
could turn “traitor.”  Thus Walker’s story loses it power to either 
stand in for or mobilize wider discontent with U.S. geopolitics.  
Instead, he is dismissed as liberalism run rampant and turned 
surreal.  He is not a result of what is “real,” because Marin is too 
preoccupied with self-indulgence to stay in touch with mainstream 
America.  Walker’s story becomes the trivial tale of a whim by 
some upper-middle-class boy in search of himself, not a man who 
is disenchanted with the U.S. and its “freedoms.” 
 
Aimee Carrillo Rowe and Sheena Malhotra 73 Poroi, 2, 1, August, 2003 
 
45 
 
Non-Christian religious forms also become rationale for dismissal 
of the potentially radical choices made by the figures within these 
texts.  Marilyn Walker “was a child of the ’60s who dabbled in 
Buddhism” (p. 33).  She strays too far from an unnamed Christian 
core that safeguards against the relativism that opens the door to 
illicit explorations of identity and affinity.  Supposedly as a result 
of lax parenting, John explored alternative modes of connecting 
with others, forming community, and challenging social norms.  At 
the “height of his fascination with hip-hop,” he may have been 
exploring anti-racism.  In an e-mail exchange, he “appeared to 
pose as an African American, writing, ‘Our blackness should not 
make white people hate us’” (p. 33).  He seems to have 
experimented with resistive identities and ties related to criticism 
of the structures of power that he had occupied.  His life was 
“transformed” at 16 when he read The Autobiography of Malcolm 
X (1973).  “Some internet postings examined by Newsweek show 
that young Walker soon became pretty militant himself” (Thomas 
2001, p. 33).  The evidence for his “militancy” is an e-mail that 
challenges the notion of Nas as “a God.”  Walker writes, “then why 
does he smoke blunts, drink Moet, fornicate, and make dukey 
music?  That’s a rather pathetic ‘god,’ if you ask me” (p. 33).  The 
story does not provide the connections between Walker’s email 
and his alleged “militancy.”  Instead it makes a move of chameleon 
conservatism:  Walker’s own conservative reading of Nas (as one 
who “drinks, smokes, and fornicates”) gets read as “militant.”  The 
story slides from the standard conservative criticism of liberalism 
as permissive and relativist to treating Walker’s conservatism as 
militancy.  This obscures the conservative constructions at work, it 
protects conservatism from criticism in connection with Walker, 
and it keeps Walker’s turn to the Taliban from implying any 
effective criticism of U.S. geopolitics. 
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The figures of April Ray and Charles Bishop have been 
pathologized in ways that mirror that of Walker.  Their behavior is 
depicted as “mysterious,” then it is explained by unstable families 
and religious experiments.  Because her mother was “married five 
times,” Ray “didn’t have much of a father figure growing up.”  She 
“dabbled in Judaism and Buddhism before settling – finally, at 40 
– on Islam” (Peraino 2002, p. 43).  Ray was raised Islamic since 
the age of 15:  roughly the time of Walker’s “conversion” and 
Bishop’s suicide.  Ray’s marriage to Wadih El-Hage was arranged 
by her mother.  On seeing his photograph, Ray is said to have 
worried, “This man’s going to beat me” (p. 43).  Supposedly Ray 
has shifted between competing and incompatible identities.  She 
has been “just another struggling young American mother,” yet she 
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also has been a potential traitor: “In parsing out Ray’s statements 
about her husband and his shadowy activities, it is difficult to sort 
out what may be psychological denial or stonewalling, and what is 
just blind faith” (p. 42).  As a young “American mother” and a 
victim deluded by her “unstable upbringing,” she was correct to 
think that El-Hage would “beat her” in one form another.  As a 
prospective traitor, however, she become an ominous threat.  
Either way, Ray is pathologized and discredited.  Her claims that 
Bin Laden “was a great boss” and “not the monster that people 
make him out to be” can be presented as the prattlings of a 
madwoman. 
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Charles Bishop is depicted as “craving attention” (Rosenberg 
2002, p. 40) because of his parents’ instability.  Twice they 
attempted double suicide.  Bishop’s father was an abusive Arab 
American who left the family when Charles was a boy, and his 
mother “moved around the country” a lot (Liston 2002, p. 48).  
The “despair beneath his wings” arose, at least in part, from his 
mixed race and religious background:  “during the Gulf war [his 
mother] changed their name to Bishop to rid themselves of his 
father’s Arabic surname” (p. 48).  Long after disappearing, the 
father tried to track him through the non-white name.  The story 
frames its multicultural and interracial ingredients into impure 
affective investments and dangerous cultural crossings by good 
white Americans.  They seem deadly for the children who result 
from such unions.  The pathology of Bishop’s ethnic past 
overshadows even the criticism of his actions:  crashing a plane 
into a Bank of America building, veering “menacingly over 
Tampa’s MacDill Air Base” (from which the war in Afghanistan has 
been directed), and leaving a suicide note sympathetic to Bin 
Laden. 
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Each of these cases show how the rhetoric of chameleon 
conservatism stifles dissent from the militarization of America.  
Chameleon conservatism frames dissidents as individuals, rather 
than representatives, then pathologizes them.  It pre-empts wider 
histories of discontent, and it leaves little room for criticisms of 
“America” that could explain such deviant actions.  Consistent with 
the encompassing formation after 9/11, the discourse of chameleon 
conservatism constructs these individuals as enigmatic, dangerous, 
and despised. 
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The conservative agenda has achieved an unprecedented 
hegemony in the U.S. post 9/11 through its chameleon ability to 
co-opt critical discourses.  Binary constructions of 9/11 have 
allowed chameleon conservatism to hijack feminist critiques of the 
treatment of women in Afghanistan, redirecting these into support 
for militarism.  Chameleon conservatism has taken over liberal 
discourses about the U.S. as an open, plural society, turning those 
into a frame for U.S. military aggression as a response to evil and 
as an inevitable outcome of 9/11.  Chameleon conservatism has 
misappropriated multicultural and democratic images of ordinary 
people as celebrities, making them into popular faces for military 
recruitment.  Thus military mobilization merges with reality TV in 
popular media.  All these moves marginalize voices of dissent and 
circumvent resistance to militarism in America. By pathologizing 
individuals whose actions, identities, and relations defy the 
dominant 9/11 narrative, the rhetoric of chameleon conservatism 
silences potential critics and disperses the constituencies that 
might heed them. 
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These strategies of chameleon conservatism co-opt feminist, 
liberal, and democratic discourses in order to militarize the nation 
and contain dissent.  They have expanded the agenda of 
chameleon conservatism to occupy a large space in the political 
spectrum.  To articulate oppositional stances to the chameleon 
form of conservatism becomes particularly difficult.  It appears to 
slide across the spectrum in ways that sustain its hegemony, 
incorporating and often distorting dissident discourses to its 
advantage.  There seems no space in mainstream media to 
formulate a critique of this conservative agenda.  It is pervasive, 
changes forms, and appropriates oppositional discourses.  Cultural 
critics do well to become aware of the chameleon properties of this 
neo-conservatism and to examine how it maneuvers the popular 
imaginary to silence dissent.  It is hard to know exactly how these 
meanings might evolve and settle eventually within the national 
imaginary.  Outlets that voice criticism pre-empted by mainstream 
media can become crucial at this historical juncture.  Only they can 
create collective spaces for authors, readers, teachers, and students 
to form communities of resistance. 
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